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ABSTRACT
In Israel, as in many other countries, a high school matriculation certificate is required by
universities and some jobs. In spite of the certificate's value, Israeli society is marked by vast
differences in matriculation rates by region and socioeconomic status. We attempted to increase the
likelihood of matriculation among low-achieving students by offering substantial cash incentives
in two demonstration programs. As a theoretical matter, cash incentives may be helpful if low-
achieving students reduce investment in schooling because of high discount rates, part-time work,
or face peer pressure not to study. A small pilot program selected individual students within schools
for treatment, with treatment status determined by previous test scores and a partially randomized
cutoff for low socioeconomic status. In a larger follow-up program, entire schools were randomly
selected for treatment and the program operated with the cooperation of principals and teachers. The
results suggest the Achievement Awards program that randomized treatment at the school level
raised matriculation rates, while the student-based program did not.
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angrist@mit.edu msvictor@mscc.huji.ac.ilOne of the most economically important education milestones in many countries and in some
American states is a high-school matriculation exam.  Examples include the French Baccalaureate, the New
York State Regents examinations, and the recently instituted Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment
System.  In Israel, a national high school matriculation exam -- known as the Bagrut – is a pre-requisite for
admission to universities and arguably marks the dividing line between the working class and the middle
class.  In spite of the Bagrut’s economic and social value, Israeli society is marked by vast differences in
Bagrut completion rates across regions and by socioeconomic status.  These disparities have led Israeli
educators and administrators to try remedial programs in an attempt to increase high school matriculation
rates.  But most of these programs appear to have had little effect.  Similarly, an array of service-oriented
anti-dropout demonstrations for American teens appears to have had little effect on graduation rates
(Dynarski and Gleason, 1998).
The discouraging results from previous anti-dropout interventions stimulated our interest in a simpler
approach that focuses on immediate financial incentives for student effort.  As a theoretical matter, cash
incentives may be helpful if low-achieving students have high discount rates, reduce investment in schooling
by going to work, or face peer pressure not to study.  The promise of more immediate financial rewards may
tip the scales in favor of schoolwork.  In this paper, we report on two demonstration projects that provided
financial awards for low-achieving high school students in Israel.  The interventions discussed here rewarded
Bagrut completion and performance on Bagrut subject tests with direct payments to students.  We also
discuss some of the methodological issues arising in evaluations of this type. 
The task of evaluating educational incentives presents a number of practical and research-design
challenges.  How should the incentives be structured?  Are incentives that target entire schools more likely
to be effective than those that target individual students?  What is an appropriate experimental design?  To
shed light on these questions, we explored two alternatives.  The first was a small pilot study that randomized
students within schools.  Because simple random assignment within schools was seen as inequitable by
administrators, we used a hybrid within-school experimental design.  Eligibility for treatment was first2
determined by forecasting the probability of Bagrut completion as a function of socioeconomic
characteristics and previous test scores.  Only students with performance in a certain range were offered
treatment.  Random assignment was introduced by lowering the selection threshold with probability one-half,
a modification justified to school administrators on the grounds that the program budget had insufficient
funds to treat everyone below the original threshold.  
A second larger intervention involved 40 schools with a very low percentage of high school seniors
obtaining Bagrut certification.  This program differed from the pilot program primarily in that treatment
assignment was determined by random assignment of entire schools and not students within schools.  The
school-level awards program was also implemented with the cooperation of principals and administrators
in treated schools. Another difference is that intermediate awards were offered for completion of individual
subject tests and for continued school enrollment, though the highest awards were offered to seniors who
ultimately obtained a Bagrut. 
Random assignment of schools rather than students generates a group-randomized trial (GRT) of the
type widely used to study interventions in naturally clustered units such as schools, hospitals, and
communities (see, e.g., Donner, Brown, and Brasher, 1990).  GRTs offer practical and cost-saving
advantages, but may not balance treatment and control characteristics when, as is typical, a small number
of units are randomized.  Under some circumstances, balance can be improved by using matched pairs, as
in our experimental design.  Another important disadvantage of clustered designs is that, because outcomes
within clusters are correlated, GRTs usually have much lower statistical power than simple randomized trials
with the same sample size (see, e.g., Feng, Diehr, Peterson, and McLerran, 2001).  Conclusions may also
depend on the statistical framework used to interpret GRT data; in particular, whether to treat the group or
the individual as the basis for inference.  We therefore explore a number of approaches to the analysis of data
from the schools GRT.
Section I provides background on the Israeli school system and describes the school-based1QOP combined services for children in AFDC families with modest financial incentives for enrollment in a
small randomized pilot.  LEAP used financial incentives along with case management and support services to
increase the school enrollment of welfare mothers in a randomized demonstration.  EMA pays children or mothers of
children in low-income families based on enrollment and achievement, and is currently being evaluated in a non-
randomized study.  Progresa offered payments based on the enrollment status of primary and secondary school
children in randomly selected towns in Mexico.  The PACES program awarded vouchers for private school in a
lottery for 6
th graders in Colombia.  This had an achievement component because vouchers were lost if students
failed to keep up with schoolwork.  As far as we know, however, ours are the first demonstrations to combine
substantial achievement-based payments to students with a randomized experimental design. 
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achievement awards program in detail.  This section also outlines the theoretical context for programs of this
type.  Other interventions in this spirit include the Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP; Hahn, Leavitt,
and Aaron, 1994); the Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) demonstration project in Ohio (Long,
Gueron, Wood, Fisher, and Fellerath, 1996); the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) in Britain
(Deardon, et al, 2001); Progresa in Mexico (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd, 2000; Schultz, 2001); and the
Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria (PACES), which provided private school
vouchers in Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer, 2002).
1  The Achievement Awards
experiment also has elements in common with the college tuition subsidy programs run by the I Have a
Dream Foundation, and Robert Reich’s (1998) proposal to pay targeted bonuses of $25,000 to high school
graduates from low-income families.
Section II discusses the pilot experiment and Section III presents background for the school-based
demonstration.  Section IV discusses results from the schools demonstration, which, while not entirely clear-
cut, suggest the probability of Bagrut certification increased by 6-8 percentage points in Award schools.
Consistent with a causal interpretation of these results, analyses conditional on previous test results show
treatment effects only for students with achievement levels that put them in a position to benefit from
additional effort.  In contrast, randomization within schools clearly failed to generate a change in
achievement.  Together these results support the hypothesis that the participation of school administrators
and teachers is important for the success of individual incentive programs like those tested here.  Section V
concludes and outlines directions for further work.4
I. Background
A. Theoretical Context
Why do young men and women fail to complete high school? Why don’t more people go to college?
These questions present something of a puzzle since the economic returns to schooling appear to be very
large, and almost certainly exceed the costs of additional schooling for most non-college graduates.  Research
on education choices suggests possible explanations for low schooling levels, mostly related to heterogeneity
in costs (or perceived costs) and heterogeneity in returns (or expected returns).  Using data from the NLSY,
for example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) link the drop-out decision to lack of ability and motivation, low
expectations about the rewards from graduation, disutility from schooling, and a comparative advantage in
the jobs available to non-graduates.  Another consideration raised in the literature on college attendance is
liquidity constraints and the role of financial aid (see, e.g., Fuller, Manski, and Wise, 1982; Card and
Lemieux, 2000).  Since capital markets are imperfect and human capital is hard to collateralize, some poor
students may chose not to go school in the absence of subsidies.
A number of features of the Israeli economic environment dovetail with the issues raised in previous
research on low educational attainment.  First, while high school is free, there is an opportunity cost to
schooling since students can work, perhaps at the expense of remedial programs that might make Bagrut
success more likely.  A related concern is that some teenagers act as if they have very high discount rates
(see, e.g., Gruber, 2000).  Israeli requirements for compulsory military service (at least 3 years for boys and
2 years for girls) probably exacerbate the impact of discounting since working life for a male college
graduate does not begin until 6-7 years after high school.  Uncertainty about returns may also be greater for
poor Israelis, who are disproportionately likely to live in small towns with few educated adult role models.
Finally, peer effects may be a negative influence in some of the relatively isolated communities where
education is lowest.
Bagrut status in Israel is not directly comparable to an American student’s drop-out status since most2Bagrut statistics for the 2000 school year are available at http//www.netvision.net.il/bagrut/
netunim2000.htm#1.4.
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of the students who fail to complete a Bagrut still finish their secondary schooling.  Nevertheless, as for
American high school dropouts, post-secondary schooling options for Israeli graduates without a Bagrut are
limited; very few non-Bagrut holders will obtain further schooling.  Of course, many students may not be
able to complete a Bagrut no matter how hard they try.  But the substantial cross-sectional and time series
variation in Bagrut rates suggests that some students attending schools with low completion rates could,
under some circumstances, do better.  This possibility is highlighted by the Ministry of Education’s practice
of reporting the proportion of high school seniors who are “close” but fail to obtain a Bagrut, on the order
of 22 percent.
2
The Achievement Awards demonstrations were motivated by a desire to tip the scales towards
current investment in schooling and away from market work or leisure, especially for students close to the
margin for Bagrut success.  The concrete and relatively immediate awards offered by the programs should
have increased the present value of studying for exams and reduced uncertainty about returns.  The programs
may also have provided a cover story that students could use to justify schoolwork in the face of ridicule by
non-studying peers.  Our intervention is in the spirit of Reich’s (1998) proposal to offer students from low-
income families in the US a $25,000 cash bonus for graduating high school.  Keane and Wolpin (2000)
simulated the impact of this policy in the context of a structural model of education choice.  They estimated
that the Reich program would have a large impact on high school graduation rates and college attendance,
especially for Blacks.  
B. The Israeli School System
Israeli education consists of elementary school (grades 1-6), middle school (grades 7-9) and high
school (grades 10-12).  High school students are enrolled in an academic track leading to a Bagrut, or in a3Bagrut subject requirements change from year to year and are described in the appendix.  Some Bagrut
tests are graded internally, but internal grades that deviate substantially from external scores are disqualified.  The
Achievement Awards program, which neither awarded nor sanctioned teachers, would seem to have offered little
incentive to lower standards and risk disqualification.
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vocational track leading to a diploma.  The Bagrut is completed by passing a series of national exams in core
and elective subjects beginning in 10
th grade, with more tests taken in 11
th grade and most taken in 12
th grade.
Students choose to be tested at various proficiency levels, with each test awarding 1 to 5 credit units per
subject, depending on difficulty.  Some subjects are mandatory and many must be taken for at least 3 units.
3
A minimum of 20 credit units is required to qualify for a matriculation certificate.  About 52 percent of all
high-school seniors received a matriculation certificate in the 1999 and 2000 cohorts (Israel Ministry of
Education, 2001).  Roughly 60 percent of those who took at least one Bagrut subject test end up receiving
a Bagrut certificate.  In our samples, however, Bagrut rates are much lower.
II. The Pilot Experiment 
Our investigation of financial incentives for students began with a pilot evaluation in the 1999-2000
school year involving approximately 500 students in low-achieving schools in Southern Israel.  We hoped
to increase the number of students taking the various Bagrut subject tests, to encourage students in trouble
to take advantage of remedial services, and to increase study effort at school and at home.  Students in the
treatment group were told that Bagrut achievers would have their choice of $800 in cash, a $1,000 voucher
to be used towards a trip of educational value, or a $1,200 voucher to be used towards the cost of higher
education.  Students who were offered the opportunity to earn an award were notified in writing in March
2000.  The time lines for both the pilot and follow-up programs appear in the Appendix.  
Treated students in the pilot were notified of the intervention later than originally planned, a fact that
reduced the scope for changes in behavior that could have increased the likelihood of obtaining a Bagrut in
June.  On the other hand, students have the opportunity to boost their efforts towards the Bagrut at any time,4Azgursky and Schmidt (2001) compare an instrumental variables design and clustered experimental design
in a simulation study.
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and have access to remedial instruction through schools and outside of school.  Moreover, Israeli seniors
have the opportunity to try some Bagrut subject tests again the following winter, provided they have not
already been drafted.  The pilot data analyzed here include the winter retests. 
  The pilot experiment differed from the larger school-based experiment which followed in that we
used a design that randomized students within schools.  Randomization within schools should have provided
a more powerful design with less data.  In practice, however, simple randomization was seen by school
administrators as hard to justify to participants and outside observers.  We therefore used a hybrid
instrumental variables design that selected students for treatment on the basis of their socioeconomic
characteristics and a partially randomized threshold, described in more detail below.
4   
A.  Sample Selection, Experimental Design and Descriptive Statistics
The sample was selected by dividing the population of 1302 seniors enrolled in the 1999-2000 school
year into three groups on the basis of the number of Bagrut subject tests they had taken previously and their
maximum score on these tests (recall that the Bagrut is determined by a series of tests, some of which are
usually taken in 10
th and 11
th grade).  We estimated Logit regressions with information from the previous
cohort of students to predict the probability of Bagrut certification as a function of these two variables,
denoted here by p1i for student i.  All students with a very low probability of Bagrut attainment (p1i<.053)
were offered the opportunity to earn a bonus.  It was inexpensive and politically expedient to offer bonuses
to this group, about 15 percent of enrolled seniors in the Southern cohort. 
At the other end, students with a very high probability of success were excluded, in particular, we
did not offer bonuses to 612 students with p1i>.66, about half of seniors.  The remaining 491 students were5The analysis sample includes 489 eligible students because of missing demographic data not used for
treatment assignment but used in the analysis.
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 potentially eligible for an award.
5  Treatment was assigned to these students as a function of family size and
father’s education, with students of lower socioeconomic status more likely to be in the treatment group.  We
chose this mechanism because the Israeli Ministry of Education commonly allocates education resources in
this way (see, e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 1999).  Again, we used the previous cohort of seniors to estimate the
probability a student would obtain a Bagrut certificate as a function of family size and father’s schooling,
denoted p2i.  To introduce an element of random assignment, we used a threshold that varied by student and
school, so that roughly half of the eligible students from each school were offered treatment.  The rule for
treatment assignment for student i in school j was
Tij = 1[p2i < q.22(j)(1!Zi) + q.7(j)Zi]
where q.22(j) and q.7(j) are the .22 and .7 quantiles of the p2i distribution in school j.  
The hybrid experimental designed  is sketched in Table 1, which reports the number of students in
the all-treated, no-treated, and eligible samples.  For the eligible sample, the table shows the number of
students exposed to a high (Zi=1) and low (Zi=0) threshold and the number offered the opportunity to earn
an award. The design is such that about half of eligible students were exposed to a high threshold and about
half of eligibles had the opportunity to earn an award.  Exposure to the high threshold instead of the low
increased the probability of treatment by about 50 percentage points since the probability of treatment
increased from about one-quarter to about three-quarters.
Descriptive statistics for the eligible, all-treated, and non-treated samples are presented in Table 2.
 About one-third of eligible students received a Bagrut.   By construction, the probability of receiving a
Bagrut is very low (%2.7 ) in the all-treated sample, and relatively high (%77.3) in the no-treated samples.
Other covariates in the table are the test-history variables used to construct the index determining eligibility
status (i.e., the regressors used to construct p1i) and the socioeconomic regressors used to construct p2i.  The6The hybrid design was powerful enough to detect a treatment effect of about .12.  Because the control
group Bagrut rate was higher in the pilot sample, this is roughly the same proportional treatment effect found in the
clustered design.  
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bottom panel provides information on some additional characteristics that can be used to assess the success
of the random assignment of the threshold shifter, Zi.  There is no significant association between Zi and any
covariate.  There is also no significant association between Zi and Bagrut status, although those exposed to
a high threshold were much more likely to have been given the opportunity to earn an award.
The experimental design detailed in Tables 1 and 2 amounts to simple random assignment for those
with p2i in the interval [q.22(j), q.7(j)].  Alternately, we can think of this as random assignment conditional on
the covariates p2i and school effects.  Finally, the design can be seen as generating an instrument, Zi, for the
endogenous regressor, Tij (endogenous in this case means correlated with family background).  We focus on
the instrumental variables interpretation, reporting reduced form estimates of the effects of exposure to the
high threshold on the likelihood of obtaining a Bagrut certificate.
B. Results
Table 3 reports the reduced form estimates for models including a range of covariates. Data are from
the eligible sample of 489 and a subsample of 439 that excludes students attending the single Bedouin school
in the sample.  Some of the models include school fixed effects.  Although exposure to a high threshold is
associated with a precisely estimated 50-53 percentage point first stage, there is no association between Zi
and Bagrut attainment. Note that because the first-stage effect was .5, standard errors for the effect of
treatment are approximately double those for the reduced form effects shown in the table.
6  
In exploratory analyses, we found some evidence of a positive effect on Bagrut rates for girls, though
also puzzling negative effects for boys.  Both results are significantly different from zero.  The positive effect
for girls seems plausible, but the negative effect for boys is puzzling, especially since it indicates a
remarkably large decline in Bagrut rates for boys in the treatment group.  A possible explanation is that this7We interviewed principals at each treatment school to verify this.  Unlike in the pilot, treated students in
this case were notified early enough to request a deferment for military service if they wanted to retake Bagrut tests. 
In practice, this option seems unlikely to have been a major contributor towards program effects.
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particular analysis by subgroup, one of many possible analyses of this type, uncovered this pattern by chance.
As a specification check, we therefore repeated the analysis  by sex in two further subgroups.  The first is
the “random assignment sample”, i.e., those students with p2i in the interval [q.22(j), q.7(j)].  For this group
Tij=Zi, and the effect of Zi should be strongest.  In contrast, for those with p2i outside this interval, the “no-
first-stage sample”, treatment status is orthogonal to Zi and determined solely by whether p2i is below q.22(j)
or above q.7(j).  
The results of this specification check, reported in Table 4, suggest the negative effect for boys and
positive effect for girls is just a chance occurrence.  Estimates using the no-first-stage sample show no
relationship between Zi and treatment status for either sex, yet the association between Zi and Bagrut rates
is even larger than in the random assignment sample where Zi=Tij.  We therefore conclude that the pilot
experiment had no effect on achievement, though a null hypothesis of modest effects cannot be rejected
either.  This built-in specification check  is a useful feature of the hybrid design.  Another useful finding is
that of the 80 awards given out in the pilot, only 2 were to students from the low-scoring all-treated sample.
No award recipients chose the travel option, and only 5 chose the $1,200 tuition voucher.  We therefore
switched to an all-cash scheme in the larger school-based experiment. 
III.  Background for the Schools Experiment 
To kick off the school-based demonstration, we conducted an orientation with principals and
administrators from treatment schools in January 2001.  Some principals chose not to participate, though
most were enthusiastic, and informed their students shortly thereafter, usually in a school assembly or a
classroom announcement.  Many schools also distributed written materials describing the program to students
and/or their parents.
7  The award schedule is detailed in the appendix.   The program was meant to last 38In May 2000, when 2000 Bagrut results were announced, Education Ministry officials referred reporters to
the Achievement Awards program as an attempt to increase scores.  This led to extensive and mostly critical media
coverage.  The program was then suspended, though the Ministry issued a press release indicating the program
would run as planned for the first year and then be assessed.  
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years, with awards given to high school students in every grade.  Two awards were offered to students who
progressed from 10
th to 11
th grade and from 11
th to 12
th grade.  Small awards of NIS500 were also given for
test-taking regardless of the outcome, with NIS1500 given for actually passing tests before senior year.  The
largest award was NIS6,000 (almost $1,500) for any senior who received a Bagrut.  
The total amount at stake for a student who passed all achievement milestones was NIS10,000 or just
under $2,400.  This is about one-third of the after-tax earnings a student could expect from working full-time
as a high-school drop-out, and about twice as much as a student might earn working full-time in two summer
months.  Due to adverse publicity, however, the awards program was suspended after the first year. The
suspension was announced in May of 2001, about a month before the Bagrut tests.  As a consequence, awards
were given for only one year of achievement and the maximum amount awarded was NIS6,000.  The
suspension and associated public controversy should have reduced the program impact least for seniors, since
they would have been in the program for only one year anyway.
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Given this unanticipated deviation from the intended scenario, it seems worth asking how likely the
program is to have affected student behavior.  As part of the follow-up effort, the Ministry of Education’s
evaluation division surveyed students in October 2001 to determine whether they remembered the program
and whether behavior changed as a result.  The response rate among seniors was low since many had already
been drafted or were hard to locate for other reasons.  Low-achieving students are probably over-represented
so the survey results are suggestive at best.  Nevertheless, almost 53 percent of the students interviewed
recalled specific program features, and over 80 percent of these recalled attending a school assembly where
program information was distributed.   Among those who remembered the program,  87 percent said the
bonus was large enough to induce extra effort and about half reported they did indeed work harder.  We also9In June of 2001, around the time of the Bagrut tests, an Israeli television station ran a special program that
included interviews with pilot participants, as well as with one of us (Lavy) and program critics.  The participants’
comments suggested the program was of considerable interest to students.  
10Israel runs semi-autonomous school systems for Secular Jews, Religious Jews, and Arabs.   Rules for
Bagrut are similar in all three systems.
11We used 1999 Bagrut rates to select and match schools because the 2000 data were incomplete when
treatment was assigned.
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found that students in treated schools reported studying 2.7 hours per week between January and June, 11
percent more than the 2.4 average hours of study in control schools.  This is consistent with the program
having caused 25% of students to study an extra 2 hours per week for 3 months.  The academic value of this
extra effort is a separate question, however, and the subject of our impact evaluation.
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A. Experimental Design and Descriptive Statistics
In December 2000, we selected 40 high schools with low 1999 Bagrut rates, but above a minimum
threshold rate of 3 percent.  Some schools with low completion rates were ineligible to participate in the
experiment for technical or administrative reasons.  The list of participating schools included 10 Arab and
10 Jewish religious schools.
10  Treatment was randomly assigned to 20 of the 40 participating schools.  The
total number of treated schools was determined by the program budget constraint, which allowed about
750,000 dollars for award payments.  
Random assignment of entire schools does not balance treatment and control characteristics as
effectively as random assignment of students within schools.  Nevertheless, while not large enough to ensure
treatment-control balance, the number of clusters used here is typical (see, e.g., Feng, et al, 2001).  To
improve treatment-control balance we used a matching strategy that paired treatment and control schools
based on lagged values of the primary outcome of interest, the average 1999 Bagrut rate.
11  Treatment was
assigned randomly within pairs, as is common in GRTs (see, e.g.,  Gail, et al, 1996).  Such pre-treatment
matching is typically worthwhile provided that (a) matching effectively balances pre-treatment outcomes;
and (b) lagged outcomes are a reasonably good predictor of future outcomes.13
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for each of the 39 schools that were initially involved in the
experiment.  There are 39 schools instead of 40 because the control school in pair 6 had closed by the time
treatment were assigned.  In follow-up contacts in March 2001, we verified the level of program participation
by contacting principals and school administrators.  School administrators in two non-compliant schools (in
pairs 14 and 15) hoped to participate but submitted student rosters shortly after the deadline.  The principals
of three schools had taken no concrete actions to inform students or teachers about the program and/or
indicated that they did not wish to participate. 
The enrollment figures in Table 5 show the number of high school seniors in each school year from
1999-2001.   Religious schools tend to be smaller than secular schools.   Schools range in size from 10 to 242
seniors in 1999, and some schools show marked changes in size from year to year.  These changes reflect
the unstable environment that characterizes Israel’s weakest schools.  Many absorb large cohorts of new
immigrants and are in small towns with substantial population movements.
Bagrut rates in 1999 ranged from 3.6-28.6 percent.  As noted above, this is much lower than the
national average of 52 percent for high school seniors.  It is important to note, however, that Bagrut rates in
2000 and 2001 were much more variable than those in 1999.  This partly reflects our sample design since
rates for 1999 were selected to be within a certain range.  The variability in Bagrut rates in later years also
results from small school size, changes in school populations due to immigration and internal migration, and
measurement error in the Bagrut data.  In practice, the 1999 Bagrut rate is not as powerful a predictor of the
2000 and 2001 Bagrut rates as we had hoped.  The R
2 from a weighted regression of the 2001 rate on the
1999 rate is .15.   On the other hand, the overall Bagrut rate in the sample was reasonably stable, ranging
from 20-22 percent.  
Although the variability documented in Table 1 is clearly undesirable, it bears emphasizing that
substantial variability in year-to-year performance measures for individual schools is not unique to our
sample.  Using data on North Carolina schools, for example, Kane and Staiger (2001) similarly found that14
much of the year-to-year variation in performance is due to school-level random shocks that come from
sources other than sampling variance and permanent differences in school characteristics.
Table 5 also reports the probability of being on the Bagrut track for seniors at each school.  Most of
the students in the sample were registered as being on the Bagrut track in spite of the low probability of
ultimately receiving a Bagrut.  In the analysis that follows, we focus on samples that include all students
since reported track-status may be endogenous.  This endogeneity is a consequence of the fact that track
status is reported with error, and errors are more likely to be corrected for those students who ultimately
received a Bagrut. 
B.  Econometric Framework 
Because treatment was randomly assigned in the schools experiment, unbiased estimates of treatment
effects can be obtained from simple treatment-control comparisons.  In practice, however, a number of
complications are worth special attention.  First, as noted above, randomization by cluster is less likely than
individual-level randomization to balance confounding factors, even after matching.  This is especially
relevant in view of the unstable Bagrut rates in Table 5.  We attempted to improve treatment-control balance
by discarding 4 pairs with the largest (as measured by t-statistics) differences in 2000 Bagrut rates.  Other
econometric issues are discussed below.
Adjusting for Non-Compliance
Schools’ compliance status may be endogenous in the sense that it was partly determined by
anticipated Bagrut rates.  If so, estimates in a sample limited to schools that complied will be biased.  A
simple approach to the compliance problem is to estimate “intention-to-treat effects”, i.e., the reduced-form
impact of the randomized offer of program participation in the full sample.  Such estimates are reported
below.  Intention-to-treat effects provide a lower bound on the effect of actual program participation and can12A recent experiment in financial education illustrates this point (Duflo and Saez, 2002).
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be re-scaled into effects on students in treated schools by using the randomized opportunity to participate
in the program as an instrumental variable for actual participation.  Because no control schools received
treatment, this approach estimates the effect of treatment on the treated (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
A second adjustment for compliance is suggested by Table 5.  Note that if we could identify
compliant schools ex ante, i.e. before treatment was assigned, efficient estimation procedures would limit
the analysis to treatment/control pairs where the treatment school is compliant.  Restricting the sample to
compliant schools generates efficiency gains because this restriction exploits prior knowledge about the link
between assignment and treatment.  Compliance status is only known ex post, however, and is therefore
endogenous.  On the other hand, Table 5 shows that non-compliant schools are concentrated at the upper end
of the distribution of 1999 Bagrut rates.  Limiting the analysis to schools with 1999 rates less than .25
eliminates 3 out of 5 non-compliant schools and 2/3 of non-compliant students.  We therefore report results
for a “low-rate sample” of schools with 1999 Bagrut rates less than .25, as well as for the full sample and the
balanced sample noted above.   As it turns out, treatment and control schools are also more comparable (as
measured by 2000 Bagrut rates) in the low-rate sample.
Inference in Group Randomized Trials
Randomized trials that assign treatment status to entire schools may be more attractive than within-
school randomization for both programmatic and logistical reasons.  First, school randomization reduces the
perception of unfairness associated with randomization.  Second, students not offered treatment may
nevertheless be affected by treatments received by others in the same school, diluting within-school treatment
effects.  Finally, education interventions may be more effective when introduced at the school level.
Incentive programs for students depend partly on the cooperation of teachers and school administrators, and
may get additional leverage from peer effects when those nearby participate.
1213GEE standard errors are produced by the Stata “Cluster” option and SAS GENMOD procedure.
14See, e.g., Thornquist and Anderson (1992).
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The most important statistical issue in school-level GRTs is whether to treat groups (schools) or
students as the unit of observation, and, if the latter, how best to adjust inferential procedures for clustering
at the group level.  As Cornfeld (1978) notes, analyses of GRTs that ignore clustering are “an exercise in
self-deception.”  The traditional cluster adjustment relies on a linear model with random effects, an approach
known to economists primarily through the work of Moulton (1986).  When the clusters are all of size n, this
amounts to multiplying standard errors by a “design effect,” [1+(n!1)D]
1/2, where D measures the intra-cluster
residual correlation.  A problem with random effects models in this context is that the equi-correlated error
structure they impose is implausible for binary outcomes like Bagrut status.  Another problem is that
estimates of D tend to be too low.
A modern variation on random effects models is the Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE)
framework developed by Liang and Zeger (1986).  GEE allows for an unrestricted correlation structure and
can be used for binary outcomes and nonlinear models such as Logit and Poisson regression.  An advantage
of GEE is that it is very flexible and increasingly available in proprietary software.
13  The primary
disadvantage is that the validity of GEE inference turns on an asymptotic argument based on the number of
clusters (as do parametric random effects models).  GRTs often have too few clusters for asymptotic formulas
to provide an acceptably accurate approximation to the finite-sample sampling distribution.
14
A simple alternative to micro-level analyses is to work with grouped data, in this case, school means.
Average Bagrut rates are approximately Normally distributed so t-tests may be valid even with a moderate
number of groups.  On the other hand, grouped analyses are conservative in the sense that they treat
additional observations within schools as if they were uninformative beyond their impact on the dispersion
of the averages.  Statistical tests based on grouped data may therefore be less powerful than those based on
micro data.  17
We present regression estimates of treatment effects using both micro and grouped data.  The model
used to construct estimates using student data can be written:
yijt = "j + xjtN$ + 3q dqi:q + *Zjt + ,ijt,( 1 )
where i indexes students; j=1, . . ., 20 indexes pairs; t=0,1 indexes treatment status within pairs, and Zjt is
assigned treatment status.  Grouped covariates includes pair effects, "j, and two school-level covariates
denoted xjt, which consist of dummies for Arab and religious schools.  The student-level covariates are three
dummies (dqi; q=2, 3, 4) indicating the quartile of a student’s average test score on Bagrut and diploma tests
taken as of January 2001, when the program was implemented.  It turns out that this lagged score variable,
described in more detail below,  is the single best predictor we have of students’ Bagrut status.
Grouped estimates were constructed similarly.  The typical grouped equation can be written:
y Gjt = "j + xjtN$ + *Zjt + 0 Gjt,( 2 )
where y Gjt is the school average Bagrut rate and 0 Gjt is a grouped error term.  Some of these estimates are
weighted by the school size, njt.  As suggested by classical results on regression efficiency, it seems natural
to weight, and weighted estimation using groups produces the same estimates as micro data when there are
no covariates.  On the other hand, in models with group random effects (implicit in this case since we worry
about clustering), weighted estimation need not be more efficient.  Moreover, when treatment effects are
heterogeneous, weighted and unweighted procedures estimate different average effects.
We also experimented with a two-step procedure discussed by Baker and Fortin (2001) and Donald
and Lang (2001).  In our case, this amounts to adjusting school means for micro covariates by estimating
school fixed effects in an equation like (1), and then regressing the estimated fixed effects on treatment status
and other school-level covariates in an equation like (2).  In particular, we first estimate
yijt = :jt + 3q dqi:q + ,ijt,( 3 )
and then regress :
^
jt, the estimated :jt, on the same covariates as in equation (2).  This procedure uses the
micro-data to reduce the dispersion in means, while inference is conservative in the sense that no credit is18
taken for within-cluster variability in the second step.   
Donald and Lang (2001) present Monte Carlo evidence suggesting the two-step estimator has good
finite sample properties for some designs and always improves on cluster-adjustments, though Baker and
Fortin (2001) report second-step estimates that are sensitive to weighting.  To address this point, we report
weighted and unweighted second step estimates.  Finally, in a direct attack on the problem of downward-
biased GEE standard errors, we estimated standard errors using Bell and McCaffrey’s (2002) Biased
Reduced Linearization (BRL) estimator for micro data.  BRL implements a correction for GEE standard
errors similar to MacKinnon and White’s (1985) bias-corrected heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance
matrix.  Bell and McCaffrey present Monte Carlo evidence suggesting BRL generates tests of the correct size
in traditional random effects models.
A final statistical issue worth noting is that some of the regression estimates are from models that
omit pair effects.  In principle, pair effects can be dropped without biasing the estimates of treatment effects
since intention to treat is assigned with equal probability across pairs.   Ignoring stratification variables may
also lead to more precise estimates in paired experiments since the inclusion of pair effects uses up degrees
of freedom (Diehr, et al, 1995; Angrist and Hahn, 1999).  On the other hand, with few pairs, a chance
association between pair characteristics and treatment status is possible.
IV.  Results from the Schools Experiment 
Post-treatment Bagrut rates in treated schools are higher on average than those in control schools,
conditional on baseline (2000) Bagrut rates.  This can be seen in Figure 1, which plots 2001 Bagrut rates
against 2000 Bagrut rates, with solid dots representing treated schools, and separate regression lines drawn
through treatment and control observations.  The plot incorporates Bagrut data from all 39 schools involved
in the experiment and shows residuals from regressions on Arab and religious school dummies.  Although
the figure indicates that average Bagrut rates in 2001 were somewhat unevenly dispersed, the regression line15Results for 1999 Bagrut rates are not shown since these are balanced by the experimental design.
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running through the averages for treated schools is almost everywhere above the regression line running
through the averages for control schools.  
Figure 2 plots the relationship between 2001 and 2000 Bagrut rates by treatment status, after
regression-adjusting for pair effects as well as dummies for Arab and religious schools.  Here the dispersion
in 2001 rates is more uniform.  The regression lines are necessarily parallel for this specification since the
residuals for each pair sum to zero.   But Figure 2 suggests that conditional on 2000 Bagrut rates, treated
schools were likely to have higher 2001 Bagrut rates than control schools.  The difference between the two
lines in Figure 2 is about 8.5 percentage points.  
A. Estimates Using School Means
As suggested by the figures, unweighted contrasts in school means show higher 2001 Bagrut rates
in treated than control schools, with no corresponding difference in 2000.  This can be seen in the first three
columns of Table 6, which report estimates of equation (2) with no controls, adding school covariates
(dummies for religious and Arab schools), and including school covariates and pair effects.  For example,
the uncontrolled difference in 2001 Bagrut rates is .075 in the full sample, though the standard error is almost
as large at .063.  Adding controls for school and pair effects increases the difference to .082, with a standard
error of .059.  At the same time, treatment-control differences in 2000 are all negative, a specification check
that reinforces the causal interpretation of the 2001 results.
15  
The standard errors quoted above (and reported in Table 6 directly below the coefficient estimates)
are conventional least-squares estimates, while those in brackets are heteroscedasticity-corrected.  The fact
that the corrected standard errors are substantially below the unadjusted standard errors, with the gap
increasing in the number of covariates, suggests downward bias in the corrected estimates  (see, e.g., Chesher
and Jewitt, 1987).  We therefore take the unadjusted standard errors as a more reliable measure of precision20
for the grouped estimates. 
The balanced and low-rate subsamples generate larger treatment effects than the full sample, again
with no evidence of a treatment-control difference in 2000 data.  On the other hand, results from weighted
contrasts in means, reported in columns 4-6, are less clear cut.  With no controls, the weighted estimates are
the same in the 2001 and 2000 full sample, a finding that clearly raises questions about the 2001 results.  The
picture is somewhat clearer, however, with additional controls and in the balanced and low-rate samples.
For example, the weighted estimate with school covariates and pair effects in the balanced sample is .061
(s.e.=.043) in 2001 and .021 (s.e.=.03) in 2000.  The weighted estimate for the balanced sample with school
covariates only, reported in column 5, is .089 (s.e.=.047) in 2001 and .053 in 2000 (.045).  
Note that the generally larger estimated effects (weighted or unweighted) in the balanced and low-
rate samples are consistent with the fact that the compliance rate is 75 percent in the full sample, but 86-87
percent in the balanced and low-rate samples.  Thus, we would expect intention-to-treat effects to be about
15 percent larger in the latter two samples, a factor that does not seem too far off the mark.  Finally, note that
while the  estimates for 2001 increase as we move to the balanced and low-rate samples, this is not typically
the case using 2000 data, providing an encouraging specification check.
B. Estimates Using Student Data
In an attempt to check robustness and increase the precision of the estimated treatment effects, we
used micro data to control for students’ performance on tests taken as of the baseline date, January 2001.
In particular, we divided the credit-unit-weighted average score on all Bagrut and Diploma tests (coding
zeros for those with no tests), and then coded dummies for each quartile of the score distribution.  We used
quartile dummies instead of, say, linear control for lagged scores, to facilitate the analysis conditional on
lagged scores discussed below.  The quartile dummies are a powerful predictor of students’ ultimate Bagrut
status.  For example, the probability of being awarded a Bagrut 2001 was about 1% in the lowest quartile,16The decline in standard errors when going from grouped to two-step estimates is consistent with fact that
the standard deviation of the estimated :
^
jt is about 82 percent of the standard deviation of y Gjt.  Note that the ratio of
two-step to grouped standard errors for the weighted full sample is .041/.05 =.82 for the model in column 6.  When
constructing standard errors for the two-step estimator we ignore the fact that the micro coefficients, :q, are
estimated using the full sample and therefore the estimated fixed effects are correlated.  Since about 1000 students
are available to estimate each quartile effect, this seems likely to be of minor importance.
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9% in the second quartile, 29% in the third quartile, and 49% in the upper quartile.
Adjusting for baseline scores using the two-step procedure described above generates more precise
and mostly larger treatment effects than the analysis of group means.  For example, the unweighted  estimate
from a model with pair effects and school covariates, reported in column 3 of Table 7, is .12 (s.e.=.051).  The
weighted estimate falls to .068 (s.e.=.041), but this now contrasts with an estimate for 2000 of only .039
(s.e.=.047). Moreover, the weighted estimates from this specification in the balanced and low-rate samples
show significant treatment effects for 2001 on the order of .07-.08, with no corresponding effect in 2000.
The weighted estimates in the balanced sample also point to a treatment effect when estimated in models with
no controls and school covariates only.
16 
The last two columns in Table 7 report estimates of treatment effects in micro data.  The standard
errors reported in parentheses use a conventional GEE cluster-adjustment, while BRL standard errors are
shown in brackets.  The estimates in column 8 are all significant, even when precision is measured using the
larger BRL standard errors.  Estimates in column 7 for the balanced sample are also significant, and again
on the order of 8%.  Moreover, none of the micro-data estimates show evidence of a (spurious) treatment
effect in 2000.  Interestingly, the BRL standard errors are often close to the unadjusted two-step standard
errors, typically slightly lower, though occasionally slightly higher.  
On balance, the results in Tables 6 and 7 support the notion that the Achievement Awards program
increased Bagrut rates in 2001 by something on the order of 6-8 percentage points (using the smaller
weighted or micro-data estimates).  As an additional check on the causal interpretation of these results, we
estimated models allowing treatment effects to vary with lagged score quartiles.  That is, we estimated
yijt = "j + xjtN$ + 3q dqi:q+ 3q*qZjt + ,ijt,( 4 )22
where *q is a quartile-specific treatment effect and :q is a quartile main effect.  Students with very low scores
were unlikely to be able to obtain a Bagrut no matter how hard they tried in the treatment year.  On the other
hand, some relatively high-scoring students had scores in a range where extra effort may have made a
difference.  We therefore look for significant estimates of *3 and *4 in 2001, but not in 2000.  
` As noted earlier, about half of students in the upper quartile ended up obtaining a Bagrut while
almost no one in the lower quartile did.  This can be seen in the pattern of control group means by quartile,
which are reported along with quartile-specific treatment effects in Table 8.  The model used for all of the
estimates in this table included school covariates and pair effects, corresponding to the estimates in column
8 of Table 7.   Small and insignificant treatment effects were estimated in the first two quartiles, with much
larger and statistically significant estimates in the third and fourth quartiles.  Results for 2000 show no
significant effects for any quartile, though the coefficient estimates for 2000 are mostly larger in the third
and fourth quartiles than in the first and second.  The absence of a significant effect for any quartile in 2000
and the large positive and significant effects for the upper quartiles in 2001 support the view that the
Achievement Awards program increased Bagrut rates.  
The data used for Tables 6 and 7 and the first 4 columns of Table 8 come from the June 2001 round
of Bagrut tests, i.e., before the Winter retests.  We focused on the initial round of test results in the schools
experiment because, as discussed above, the program was disrupted in early summer by adverse publicity.
This seems likely to have reduced the scope for a treatment effect in the retests.  A second consideration is
that there was a unexpected round of second-chance Bagrut tests offered in math and English in late
summer/early Fall 2001, between the first round and the traditional Winter round.  We are not sure how this
might have affected the Achievement Awards program, but some observers noted that the purpose here
seemed to be to get Bagrut rates up by easing standards.  In any case, the last 4 columns of Table 8, which
report estimated treatment effects by quartile using data that incorporates results from the unexpected second
chance and the Winter retests, show results broadly similar to the June results.  The largest treatment control17The estimates for 2000 in columns 5-8 differ from those in columns 1-4 because, for comparability, the
2000 results used to construct these estimates also include Winter re-tests.  
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differences appear in the third and fourth quartile, while there are no significant effects in 2000.
17  Estimates
for the fourth quartile are somewhat smaller and no longer significant in the full sample, but remain
significant in the balanced and low-rate samples.  Estimates for the third quartile are somewhat larger.
V.  Conclusions and Further Work
Although the evidence is not seamless, the school-based randomized trial suggests worthwhile gains
in matriculation rates can be obtained by offering cash awards in low-achieving schools.  The value of the
awards was substantial from the point of view of high school seniors, but pales in comparison with the likely
economic benefits of a matriculation certificate.  To see this, note that the bonus offer of NIS6,000 shekels
was worth about $1429 at the time the treated cohort finished school.   About 27 percent of the treatment
group received bonuses, so the cost was about $385 per treated student.  To provide a rough assessments of
the benefits, note that earnings of workers with 11-12 years of schooling in 2000 were about $16,100 (Israel
central Bureau of Statistics, 2002).  Those with some college earned 53 percent more.  Suppose the causal
effect of a Bagrut is less than half of this, say 25 percent, and that the effect of the program was to raise
Bagrut rates by 7 percentage points.  Then the program should increase annual earnings in the treated group
by 16,100 × .25 × .07 = $282 per person per year, so the cost of the bonus will be quickly recovered.  
Another way to benchmark costs and benefits is by comparison with other Bagrut-enhancement
strategies.  In the introduction we noted that most service-oriented strategies appear to have been ineffective.
Not long after the Achievement Awards demonstration, however, the Ministry of Education piloted a
relatively expensive service-oriented strategy offering intensive after-school  instruction to small groups of
under-performing students in several matriculation subjects.  The results of an evaluation point to an 11
percent increase in Bagrut rates for students in the group offered treatment, at an average cost of $1,100 per
student (Israel Ministry of Education, 2002).  The after-school program therefore cost almost 3 times as24
much, while producing an effect only about 50 percent larger.
In contrast with the school-based bonuses intervention, a smaller pilot program that selected
individual students within schools for treatment, with treatment status determined by previous test scores and
a randomized cutoff for low socioeconomic status, had no effect.  This suggests that school-wide
mobilization may be an important part of the incentive structure in programs of this type.  On the other hand,
delays and a relatively small sample may also account for the lack of a finding in the pilot.  
On the methodological side, the paper compares alternative strategies for inference in a GRT.  A
graphical analysis suggests the program had an effect, albeit heterogeneous and variable across schools.
Statistical analyses of school means generates results with a clear pattern of effects when unweighted, but
more mixed results when weighted.  A two-step method that uses micro data to reduce the dispersion of
group averages generates somewhat sharper weighted results than a straight grouped analysis, while bias-
corrected standard errors for micro-data estimates also leave an impression of significant effects.  Finally,
conditioning on lagged test scores generates a pattern of estimates consistent with the notion that the program
raised matriculation rates.
The analysis here covers the immediate short-run impact on the Achievement Awards programs’
target objective, high school matriculation status.  In work in progress, we are looking at additional mediating
outcomes, such as whether treated students took more tests or changed subjects, and whether they
participated in remedial instruction.  In future work, we hope to assess the long-run effects of the
Achievement Awards program by collecting information on university attendance and possibly earnings.
Finally, we are conducting a detailed Monte Carlo study of alternate modes of inference with school-based
randomized trials.  25
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APPENDIX: ACHIEVEMENT AWARDS PROGRAM RULES AND TIMING
Program Rules
1.  Award schedule
Grade Milestone Reward (NIS)
10 Tested for at least 1 unit; 500
enrolled in 11
th grade
Passed this test 1500
11 Tested for at least 3 units; 500
enrolled in 12
th grade
Passed this/these test(s) 1500
12 Completed 14 credit units 1000
Completed 20 credit units 5000
and awarded Bagrut
2.  Tests are considered to have been passed if the external component is passed.
3. Only tests in required subjects are eligible for intermediate awards.  At the time this program was
introduced (January 2001), the required subjects were Bible (2 units), literature (2 units), history (2 units),
civics (2 units), composition (2 units), english (3 units), mathematics (3 units).  The remaining 5 units can
be in any Bagrut-eligible elective subject.  Many students, e.g. those competing for admission to selective
universities, obtain more than the minimum number of credit units.  
4.  Awards for achievement in a given year are to be paid in the following school year.
5.  All students in treatment schools are eligible.
6.  Students with at least 14 units have two chances to take Bagrut exams in 12
th grade.  Awards will be given
to those who pass on the first, second, or any subsequent try.  PROGRAM AND DATA COLLECTION TIME LINE
Program Schools Orientation  Baseline  Media  Bagrut  Student    Re-test Re-test
selected for principals data coverage tests survey
and principals and students 
informed informed
School December  January January May  June  Aug/Sept/ Aug-Sept December
randomization 2000 2001 2001 2001 2001 Oct 2001 2001 2001 -
(math and January 2002
english)
Note: in March 2001 principals were interviewed to determine whether the program was publicized in schools.
Bonuses were paid in May 2002.
Student March March March September June  July/Aug/ -- December
randomization 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 Sept 2000 2000 -




Note: in May 2000 principals were interviewed to determine whether the program was publicized in schools.
Bonuses for the June test were first paid in November 2000.  Additional bonuses were paid in 2001. 




















Range for  Range for  Low High No  Yes Row 
p1i p2i q.22 q.7 Totals
[0, q.15] -- -- 0 146
[q.15, q.53][ 0 ,  q .22] 59 64 0 123 123
[q.22, q.7] 127 125 127 125 252
[q.7, 1] 56 58 114 0 114
Column Totals 241 248 242 247 489
[q.53, 1] -- -- 612 0
C.  No-treated Sample (p1i>.67)
Threshold for p2i Offered Bonus
Table 1:  Experimental Design for the Pilot Demonstration
A.  All-Treated Sample (p1i<.053)
B.  Eligible Sample (.053<p1i<.67)
Note:  The table describes the experimental design used in the pilot demonstration.  The sample of 1247 
described in the table is reduced from the full sample of 1302 because of missing covariates.  The notation 
qx refers to the x-quantile of the distribution of fitted values, p1i or p2i.  Quantiles are school specific, so that
about half of the eligible students in each school where offered a bonus.Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Pilot Experiment 
 
Eligible sample  All-treated  No-treated 
(N=489) (N=146)    (N=612) 
 
 













       
Program Variables         
       
Received bagrut  0.329  -0.003  0.027    0.773 
(0.470)  (0.043)  (0.164)  (0.419) 
Treated (offered an award)  0.507  0.521       
(0.500) (0.039)     
High/Low Threshold (Zi)  0.505       
(0.500)       
       
Eligibility Determination         
       
Tests Passed at baseline  3.603  0.016  0.432    6.995 
(1.908)  (0.173)  (0.609)  (1.435) 
Maximum Score at baseline  79.632  1.243  33.219    96.510 
(8.287) (0.748)  (26.842)    (3.988) 
p1i (fitted value)  0.357  0.021  0.017    0.828 
(0.180)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.069) 
       
Treatment Assignment         
       
Siblings 3.730  -0.227  4.893    4.210 
(2.306)  (0.209)  (2.983)  (2.333) 
Father's Education  10.027  0.246  7.949    11.674 
(3.684)  (0.333)  (4.580)  (3.448) 
p2i (fitted  value)  0.341  0.007     
(0.082) (0.007)     
       
Other Covariates         
       
Sex 0.409  -0.041  0.500    0.371 
(0.492)  (0.045)  (0.502)  (0.483) 
Mother's Education  10.069  0.229  7.391    11.513 
(3.823)  (0.346)  (4.765)  (3.168) 
Immigrant 0.139  0.046  0.068    0.141 
(0.346)  (0.031)  (0.253)  (0.348) 
Bedouin School  0.102  -0.035  0.349    0.033 
(0.303)  (0.027)  (0.478)  (0.178) 
       
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for three subsamples from the pilot experiment conducted in 
Southern Israel.  All 146 students with a very low predicted probability of obtaining a Bagrut (p1i) were 
offered awards (all-treated sample).  None of the  612 students with a high predicted probability of 
obtaining a Bagrut were offered awards (no-treated sample).  Offers in the middle group, referred to as the 
eligible sample, were determined by whether an index of students’ socioeconomic background (p2i) fell 
below a randomly assigned threshold determined by Zi.  Standard deviations are reported in parentheses in 







                   Table 3:  Reduced Form Effects in the Pilot Experiment (Eligible Sample) 
  
  All Eligible Pupils  Jewish Eligible Pupils 
  No   School Covs  School f.e.  p1i, sex,  No   School f.e. 
  Covariates p2i p 2i School  f.e.,  Covariates p2i 
Dependent       P2i    
Variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
          
Offered 0.521  0.531  0.535  0.535 0.503  0.526 
(0.039) (0.030) (0.028)  (0.028) (0.041)  (0.030) 
          
Received -0.003  0.005  0.001 -0.017  0.013 0.014 
Bagrut (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.044) 
                      
Table 4:  Results by Sex in the Pilot Experiment 
 
    All eligibles  Random-assignment Sample No-first-stage Sample 
Dependent    Boys Girls  Boys Girls  Boys Girls 
Variable      (1) (2)    (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
            
Offered    0.514 0.540  1  1  0.047 0.057 
Bonus    (0.046) (0.037)     (0.056)  (0.053) 
            
Received    -0.149 0.118  -0.130 0.080  -0.175 0.133 
Bagrut    (0.063) (0.056)  (0.097) (0.078)  (0.089) (0.085) 
            
N    200 289  104 148  96  141 
                           
Notes:  The table reports coefficients on Zi (high/low threshold) in regressions with the 
covariates indicated.  The sample size is 489.  Columns 4 and 6 report results from models with 
school fixed effects.  School clustering is ignored in columns 1,2, & 5.  School covariates consist 
of a dummy for religious schools and a dummy for the single Bedouin School. 
Notes:  The table reports coefficients on Zi (high/low threshold) in regressions using the samples indicated.  All models 
contain p2ii and school fixed effects, as in column 3 in the previous table.  The random-assignment sample consists of 
eligible students with p2i in the interval [q.22, q.7], where the offer of a bonus equals the randomly  assigned threshold.  
The no-first-stage sample has p2ii outside this range, where the offer of a bonus is unrelated to the randomly assigned Table 5:  Descriptive Statistics for the Schools Experiment 
          All Pupils    Percent of Students on 
Pair  Treated  Non-  Arab  Religious  Enrollment  Bagrut Passing Rate    the Bagrut Track 
    Complier  School  School  1999  2000  2001  1999 2000 2001    1999  2000  2001 
1      X    153  173  175  0.046  0  0.091    0.889 0.850 0.914 
1  X    X  56  59  45  0.036  0.05  0    0.464  0.949  0.800 
2        X  242  169  147  0.054 0.101 0.184    0.083  0.385  0.231 
2  X        179 184 145  0.05 0.109 0.11    0.704  0.679  0.676 
3       88  99  72  0.114  0  0.056    0.625  0.556  0.750 
3  X  X   123  128  99  0.098  0.055  0.03    0.984  0.945  0.919 
4       81  68  73  0.148  0.162  0.082    0.926  0.956  0.932 
4  X  X   187  221  248  0.134  0.394  0.339    0.738  0.928  0.899 
5       125  124  96  0.152  0.105  0.083    0.960  0.952  0.958 
5  X    X  55  39  39  0.145  0.077  0.692    0.182  0.410  0.718 
6  X        117  123  123  0.171 0.138 0.154    0.530  0.504  0.496 
7        X  16  28  16  0.188 0.214 0.375    1.000  1.000  1.000 
7  X    X  67  85  58  0.179  0.165  0.483    0.791  0.588  0.793 
8        X  57  48  61  0.193 0.771 0.328    0.526  1.000  1.000 
8  X        90  96  113  0.189 0.188 0.168    0.744  0.990  0.991 
9       61  40  59  0.197  0.35  0    0.344  0.500  0.576 
9  X    X  10  14  9  0.2  0.071  0.667    1.000  1.000  1.000 
10        X  34  39  26  0.206 0.41 0.654    0.941  1.000  1.000 
10  X  X      135  135  108  0.207 0.267 0.361    0.785  0.785  0.769 
11       136  148  134  0.213  0.176  0.164    1.000  0.980  0.963 
11  X        129  158  152  0.209 0.165 0.092    0.915  1.000  1.000 
12      X    19  24  20  0.211  0.667  0.25   1.000 1.000 1.000 
12  X    X  32  44  24  0.219  0.25  0.5    1.000  1.000  0.958 
13       146  119  123  0.219  0.16  0.211    0.548  0.563  0.593 
13  X        85  79  86  0.224 0.367 0.372    0.682  0.785  0.953 
14       208  169  186  0.236  0.154  0.274    0.981  0.964  0.984 
14 X  X  X    75  50  64  0.227 0.56 0.484    0.907  0.980  0.984 
15      X    156  152  163  0.244 0.177 0.331    0.628  0.776  0.939 
15 X  X      138 141 152  0.254 0.61 0.467    0.739  0.759  0.618 
16      X    102  115  108  0.255 0.226 0.213    0.471  0.809  0.537 
16 X        74  60  75  0.257 0.1 0.107    0.784  0.833  0.573 
17        X  23  14  16  0.261  0.071  0    0.696 0.857 0.813 
17  X  X  76  68  67  0.263  0.441  0.448    1.000  1.000  1.000 
18      X    216  209  219  0.273 0.311 0.301    0.958  0.990  0.932 
18  X  X      200  148  110  0.275 0.162 0.173    0.680  0.622  0.509 
19       141  111  77  0.284  0.54  0.636    0.865  0.892  1.000 
19  X  X      123  40  62  0.276 0.025 0.081    0.805  0.975  0.903 
20       185  159  111  0.286  0.164  0.126    0.962  0.987  0.973 
20  X  X   144  141  167  0.285  0.397  0.353    0.743  0.922  0.731 
 
Notes: The table reports statistics for each school in the 2001 school-level experiment.  The control school in pair 6 closed before 
treatment assignments were announced.  Non-compliant schools are treated schools that did not participate in the program. 
 
  
Table 6:  Grouped Estimates for the Schools Experiment 
Unweighted Weighted 
    No controls  Sch Cov  Sch Cov + 
Pair 
No controls  Sch Cov  Sch Cov + 
Pair 
Sample  Mean  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
A.  2001 Sample 
1.  All Pairs  (39 Schools; 3828 Pupils)  0.245  0.075  0.078  0.082  0.048  0.057  0.056 
  (0.063) (0.059) (0.059)  (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) 
  [0.062] [0.057] [0.038]  [0.047] [0.047] [0.033] 
2. Balanced Pairs (31 Schools; 2950 Pupils)  0.216  0.119  0.110  0.108  0.083  0.089  0.061 
  (0.070) (0.062) (0.053)  (0.052) (0.047) (0.043) 
  [0.067] [0.057] [0.034]  [0.048] [0.042] [0.028] 
3. Low-rate Pairs (28 Schools; 2664 Pupils)  0.222  0.098  0.079  0.087  0.057  0.063  0.066 
  (0.076) (0.065) (0.048)  (0.057) (0.055) (0.046) 
  [0.073] [0.059] [0.031]  [0.053] [0.052] [0.038] 
B.  2000 Sample 
1.  All Pairs  (39 Schools; 4021 Pupils)  0.226  -0.021  -0.019  -0.016  0.048  0.05  0.042 
  (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)  (0.054) (0.055) (0.061) 
  [0.061] [0.059] [0.043]  [0.054] [0.052] [0.039] 
2. Balanced Pairs (31 Schools;  3214 Pupils)  0.195  -0.007  -0.004  -0.004  0.052  0.053  0.021 
  (0.055) (0.052) (0.039)  (0.047) (0.045) (0.030) 
  [0.054] [0.049] [0.025]  [0.049] [0.044] [0.019] 
3. Low-rate Pairs (28 Schools; 2815 Pupils)  0.188  -0.042  -0.046  -0.046  0.049  0.049  0.010 
  (0.073) (0.074) (0.066)  (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) 
  [0.071] [0.071] [0.046]  [0.053] [0.051] [0.038] 
Notes: The table reports treatment effects estimated using school averages.  Weighted estimates are weighted by school size.  Conventional 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Standard errors in brackets are robust (heteroscedasticity consistent).  
Table 7:  Estimates Using Micro Data for the Schools Experiment 
               
  Two-Step Procedure  Micro Data 
 Unweighted  Weighted     
  No Controls  Sch Cov  Sch Cov + Pair  No Controls  Sch Cov  Sch Cov + Pair  Sch Cov  Sch Cov + Pair 
Sample  (1) (2)  (3)    (4) (5)  (6)    (7)  (8) 
A.  2001 Sample 
1.  All Pairs  0.107  0.110  0.116  0.046  0.056  0.068  0.056  0.068 
  (0.054) (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.041) (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.036)  (0.026) 
  [0.053] [0.047]  [0.034]  [0.038] [0.036]  [0.026]  {0.039}  {0.038} 
2.  Balanced Pairs  0.145  0.136  0.138  0.075  0.082  0.074  0.081  0.073 
  (0.062) (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.045) (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.024) 
  [0.059] [0.049]  [0.032]  [0.041] [0.032]  [0.025]  {0.034}  {0.035} 
3.  Low-rate Pairs  0.137  0.120  0.133  0.051  0.056  0.083  0.055  0.089 
  (0.067) (0.055)  (0.046)  (0.049) (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.036) 
    [0.064] [0.050]  [0.031]  [0.044] [0.041]  [0.032]   {0.044}  {0.053} 
 
B.  2000 Sample 
1.  All Pairs  -0.009  -0.007  -0.003  0.028  0.032  0.039  0.031  0.040 
  (0.050) (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.043) (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.041)  (0.030) 
  [0.049] [0.047]  [0.033]  [0.043] [0.042]  [0.031]  {0.044}  {0.045} 
2.  Balanced Pairs  0.015  0.017  0.017  0.042  0.044  0.033  0.043  0.033 
  (0.044) (0.040)  (0.034)  (0.038) (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.019) 
  [0.043] [0.038]  [0.022]  [0.040] [0.033]  [0.019]  {0.037}  {0.028} 
3.  Low-rate Pairs  -0.023  -0.028  -0.023  0.034  0.035  0.016  0.033  0.009 
  (0.057) (0.056)  (0.048)  (0.044) (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.035)  (0.029) 
    [0.055] [0.053]  [0.034]   [0.038] [0.036]  [0.031]   {0.039}  {0.046} 
Notes: Columns 1-6 report estimates using school fixed effects from a student-level regression included lagged score quartiles.  Conventional 
standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Standard errors in brackets are robust (heteroscedasticity-consistent).  Columns 7 and 8 report 
regression results using micro data, with controls for lagged score quartiles.  Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for school clustering 
using the formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986).  Standard errors in braces use MacCaffrey and Bell’s (2002) BRL estimator.  
 
Table 8: Effects on Early and Late Bagrut Rates by Quartile of Previous Test Scores 
    Estimates by quartile: June 2001  Estimates by quartile: Winter 2002 









    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
A. 2001 Sample 
1.  All Pairs  Treatment   0.037 0.016 0.106 0.115  0.034 0.013 0.126 0.071 
     (mean=.245)  Effects    (0.044) (0.031) (0.041) (0.063)  (0.044) (0.035) (0.042) (0.062) 
{0.049} {0.041} {0.051} {0.078}  {0.046} {0.044} {0.053} {0.078} 
Control group means   0.010 0.092 0.292 0.486  0.010 0.123 0.343 0.570 
         
2.  Balanced Pairs  Treatment   0.041 -0.026 0.096 0.182  0.032 -0.015 0.126 0.137 
     (mean=0.216)  Effects    (0.058) (0.028) (0.042) (0.057)  (0.054) (0.031) (0.042) (0.052) 
{0.067} {0.038} {0.053} {0.066}  {0.058} {0.040} {0.052} {0.062} 
Control group means  0.005 0.063 0.228 0.406  0.005 0.087 0.269 0.499 
         
3.  Low-rate Pairs  Treatment   0.071 0.000 0.132 0.159  0.067 0.003 0.158 0.118 
     (mean=.222)  Effects    (0.056) (0.041) (0.053) (0.068)  (0.043) (0.041) (0.049) (0.064) 
{0.076} {0.058} {0.069} {0.080}  {0.052} {0.054} {0.063} {0.076} 
Control group means   0.011 0.096 0.246 0.435  0.011 0.123 0.293 0.544 
 
B. 2000 Sample 
1.  All Pairs  Treatment   0.027 0.012 0.056 0.065  0.037 0.019 0.051 0.055 
     (mean=226)  Effects    (0.040) (0.033) (0.049) (0.061)  (0.041) (0.033) (0.049) (0.056) 
{0.041} {0.046} {0.064} {0.079}  {0.044} {0.044} {0.061} {0.072} 
Control group means  0.019  0.086 0.24 0.498  0.028 0.119 0.287 0.561 
         
2.  Balanced Pairs  Treatment   0.026 0.004 0.048 0.055  0.032 0.009 0.035 0.047 
     (mean=.195)  Effects  (0.041) (0.023) (0.045) (0.056)  (0.043) (0.026) (0.043) (0.058) 
  {0.044} {0.031} {0.055} {0.064}  {0.046} {0.032} {0.051} {0.066} 
Control group means  0.002 0.067 0.192 0.425  0.032 0.101 0.256 0.530 
         
3.  Low-rate Pairs  Treatment   0.017 -0.023 -0.004 0.039  0.030 -0.006 0.016 0.053 
     (mean=.188)  Effects    (0.045) (0.032) (0.049) (0.067)  (0.046) (0.039) (0.054) (0.066) 
    {0.053} {0.044} {0.061} {0.087}  {0.055} {0.051} {0.065} {0.080} 
 Control group means  0.000 0.056 0.209 0.413  0.005  0.086   0.242   0.455 
 
Notes: The table reports estimated treatment effects for early and late Bagrut outcomes.  Treatment effects vary by quartile of summary Bagrut scores through 
January 2001 or January 2000.  Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering using formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and in braces using 
MacCaffrey and Bell’s (2002) BRL estimator.   The models correspond to those in column 8 of Table 7 (control for school covariates and pair effects). 